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So far as I've understood objectivism is about direct realism, and supposes that we have a direct contact with the world. But how are then appearances of objects possible? And does sense data on our percepts exist, or what kind of fuction do they have?

asked Oct 27 '12 at 04:46

kevindurant's gravatar image


edited Oct 28 '12 at 12:53

Greg%20Perkins's gravatar image

Greg Perkins ♦♦

If you have access to Harry Binswanger's presentations "Perception" and "Consciousness as Identification" he does an in depth analysis of naive realism and subjectivism as false theories of perception/conception and how consciousness, as Ayn Rand discusses in the "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" is an active process of identification. He goes in depth into the form/object distinction, where percepts are distinguished as the form or product of the nature of the sensory systems interacting with the nature of the objects which are separate and thus independent of our nature. In "Consciousness as Identification" he goes on in depth into the role perception plays in our formation of concepts.

answered Oct 27 '12 at 14:41

dream_weaver's gravatar image

dream_weaver ♦

edited Oct 28 '12 at 13:24

Our physical perceptive apparatuses (ears, eyes, nose, tongue, skin) have direct contact with the world. The actions, of the world, on our perceptual apparatuses give us percepts. Percepts, as such, are beyond judgment or error -- they are the direct result of us being in the world.

Percepts have a particular form depending on the mode or modes of perception used. All modes of perception give us information about the object, thereby making our percept of it rich and detailed (if we use all of our senses), or meager if we use only one or two senses.

From percepts, we must form abstractions, or concepts, which are groupings (integrations) of percepts based on their similarities and differences.

When one thing "appears" to be another, it just means that the percept of it is easy to confuse with percept of something else. That is, it might be easy to mistakenly classify a particular percept under the wrong concept. By "wrong" concept, I mean a concept for things which are subtantially different from the object currently being classified, even if there might be a superficial resemblance.

Percepts are pre-conceptual, and therefore pre-propositional. The words "true" and "false" or "correct" and "incorrect" do not apply to percepts as such. Percepts just are, and we form and use concepts and propositions to work with objects which we perceive.

answered Oct 28 '12 at 15:14

John%20Paquette's gravatar image

John Paquette ♦

edited Oct 28 '12 at 15:20

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Asked: Oct 27 '12 at 04:46

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Last updated: Oct 28 '12 at 15:20