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Are we ever morally obligated to help others in an emergency situation? If so, such action might be a form of self-sacrifice, so what fundamental principle is at work here? (I've read a bit about metaphysical emergencies, but the whole concept seems somewhat murky to me.) |
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The answer is yes. But note that a moral obligation certainly does not necessarily imply a political obligation. Just because it might be right for you to help someone (and wrong for you not to) in a particular context, that doesn't mean anyone has the right to force you to help. Here's an example. You are at a shopping mall, and you see an older man collapse to the floor, clutching his arm and chest. It would be morally reprehensible for you not to take out your cell phone and call 911, assuming you aren't already in the process of dealing with some important emergency of your own. But you should not be arrested for not helping, if you choose not to. And if someone punches you to steal your phone to call 911, then he should be arrested. There are many situations where there is no good reason not to help someone. There are also situations where there are very good reasons to help someone (not the least of which is if you've already been paid to help them). In these situations, you are morally obligated to help. And, when you help, in these situations, it is never a self-sacrifice. "if someone punches you to steal your phone to call 911, then he should be arrested" Really? Do you agree that this would fall under the category of "ethics of emergencies"? Context is important here. In a shopping mall, there are usually many people with cell phones whom you don't need to punch. Most definitely, though, the existence of an emergency in public does not entitle a "do-gooder", legally or morally, to run roughshod over anyone present. Personally having an emergency might excuse some behavior, morally, but not legally. The law, in large measure, exists to protect us from each other's "emergencies". Sometimes the right thing to do is to break the law and go to jail -- not to seek exceptions to the law just because you had or saw an emergency. The "ethics of emergencies" concerns situations where everyone is in a shared emergency, and people must fight each other, with force, to survive. In such a situation, there is no issue of rights. The ethical thing is simply to fight for survival. If an emergency is one person's problem, in a context where rights do apply, then ethical behavior on his part could properly be illegal. Being in dire straits doesn't excuse violence in society. One has a responsibility to stay out of dire straits. Back to my original question about the moral obligation: What primary Objectivist principle is at work here? It's not ad hoc?? Many emergency situations will involve some self-sacrifice in order to help others in dire need. I might miss a very important meeting, or I might even risk some injury to myself (even if my life itself is not at risk). What then? 2
Self-sacrifice is never a virtue. In the cases where it is right for you to help others, it is right because it is right for you. When you go out of your way to help someone in need, it's because, on some level, you value them, even just as a fellow human. You may miss a meeting, but you miss it because the person you save is more important to you. Whether you save someone in need is your personal choice, for your own sake. Just to be clear, when I asked the question, I was thinking of a situation where it was a friend or relative that had the heart attack, and that it appeared there were no other cell phones available. I find it strange that Objectivism would consider it wrong to try to seek exceptions to the law. Willingly going to jail, without appealing to a judge or jury, for doing something which was not wrong, seems like a useless sacrifice to me. "In the cases where it is right for you to help others, it is right because it is right for you. When you go out of your way to help someone in need, it's because, on some level, you value them, even just as a fellow human." Is this self-interest really what the metaphysical emergency concept is all about? Or is there something special about metaphysical emergencies beyond self-interest? I'm trying to get a handle on that concept. Anthony, here's an example: say you get lazy and fail to go to work, and get into such dire straits (an "emergency") that you must steal some food. It is right for you to steal the food rather than just dying, but after doing so, you should accept the punishment, attempt to pay restitution, and reform your lazy ways. The point is, a personal emergency may require you to break the law. But you are still responsible for your actions and situation. The law recognizes that your emergency is YOURS, not others'. That you must break the law doesn't mean you should not be punished. orb, an emergency when your life is threatened by metaphysical conditions. In such a situation, your life requires action -- sometimes aggression against others who might be in the same situation. Morality is about self-interest. In an emergency (which you did not cause), the moral thing to do is fight to live. Rights don't apply in the context of metaphysical emergencies. What belongs to whom is irrelevant if everyone is about to die. You just take what you need. The point is, normal life is not an emergency, so you can't just take what you need and get away with it. If I were to twist your examples a little bit: I drink a lot and destroy my kidney. I then force a doctor to kill someone and transfer his kidney over to me. I live and that someone dies. My punishment is to spend a life time in jail. Would you say that it's "right" for me to kill someone? Does "right" = "moral"? Right does mean moral. But your example is not one of morality. Killing someone isn't something you can pay restitution for. Stealing a little food is. Stealing is morally ok, in an emergency, as long as you are committed to pay restitution in addition to accepting punishment. So, restitution, then, is important in these situations. Without a commitment to pay restitution, there can be no morality in forcing others to pay for your emergencies. John, that was not an answer to my question. Here....... Ayn Rand states, "It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one’s power." (!) What fundamental Objectivist principle is at work here? Or is this really the arbitrary statement that it appears to be?? "It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one’s power." This means you shouldn't volunteer help to a stranger who is not in dire need of it. I'm sure that context is important to understanding this statement by Ayn Rand. I don't fully know that context off the top of my head. But I'd guess that the context is not situations such as helping your neighbor bring in her groceries. She's talking about strangers, not neighbors, not friends. Helping a stranger who doesn't obviously really need help could be seen as nosy. I'm sure the context is also not one of holding doors open for strangers who are entering the same building as you are. This question is related: http://objectivistanswers.com/questions/493/should-you-help-a-man-whos-dying-in-front-of-you Yes, she was referring to life-threatening emergency -- and that is the context in which I am asking the question: What fundamental Objectivist principle is at work here? The fundamental principle is self-interest, or selfishness. Ayn Rand's morality is egoistic. Altruists advocate helping others all the time. Ayn Rand advocates it only when the result is some benefit to the helper. Helping should never be done at great risk to the helper, unless a great value of his is at stake (such as his wife's life). Can anyone answer my question, please? Why is it proper in life-threatening emergency situations to help complete strangers? (according to Rand herself -- see the Ayn Rand Lexicon) This is not self-interest, and in many cases, there may be some degree of self-sacrifice. It's a proper response that follows from feelings of empathy and compassion towards those who are in life threatening situations. Rand said, "I regard compassion as proper only toward those who are innocent victims.." Using a realistic example, let's say you're walking by an alley and you see a person being beaten. The proper response for any observer (child, female, male, etc) is some kind of action. Your response might be as simple as calling 911, or as dramatic as pulling out your registered gun to scare away the attacker. Either way, action is a proper response to your own feelings of compassion and empathy. On a different note, some people act in these situations because they know that by NOT acting, they would feel horrible.. (knowing that you could have saved someone's life but chose not to in order to make it into work on time or something, would leave you feeling guilty at the very least.) So to avoid these negative feelings, it would be in your self interest to act. "Why is it proper in life-threatening emergency situations to help complete strangers? (according to Rand herself -- see the Ayn Rand Lexicon) This is not self-interest, and in many cases, there may be some degree of self-sacrifice." Ayn Rand was not saying "help strangers in emergencies". She was saying "don't help strangers in non-emergencies." So, it's not some Objectivist principle dictating the helping of others in emergencies. The reason you help strangers in emergencies is that you want to help. Why do you want to help? Because you value human life. To quote Ayn Rand: "It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one’s power. For instance, a man who values human life and is caught in a shipwreck, should help to save his fellow passengers (though not at the expense of his own life)." Note, there is no self-sacrifice demanded or involved. And yes, it is self-interest because you value human life. Mdegges, Feelings of compassion and empathy could also apply to those starving in Ethiopia, but Rand does not say that one "should" help there, because it's not considered an emergency. (I suppose it is seen as a longer term issue of human failures.) She seems to make a special exception for emergencies for what one "should" do. All humans should value the lives of other humans? Is that what Rand is saying, or is that what you are saying, John? We live in societies, because other people are of value to us. Living alone, on a desert island, is worse than living in a city, with thousands of other people to trade with. It is this simple fact which motivates one to save one's fellow humans in an emergency. Humans alive can make your life better. Humans dead cannot. In an emergency you may need to team up with people. Why let them die? Ayn Rand doesn't "tell" us to "value people". It's a fact that people are valuable. I do not believe that Rand, Peikoff, or Brook would agree with your assertion that helping in a very rare and serious emergency is done so in self-interest. The existence of a significant number of individuals to trade with is of value, but putting yourself out to save one complete stranger in the 'sea of individuals' is not self-interested by any stretch. Ayn Rand was an egoist to the core. She believed that everything worth doing was done for one's own sake. She abhorred selflessness, and would never recommend anyone do anything which was of no personal selfish value whatsoever. To claim that she'd recommend saving strangers in an emergency, for no selfish reason at all, is without basis. For Ayn Rand, the word "selfish" in the phrase "selfish reason" is redundant. All reasons are selfish. Reason as such is selfish. And all rational actions are self-interested. I still don't agree that helping in a life-or-death emergency is about self-interest. However, playing along with that idea, you must admit that whether you save a person or choose to let them die will depend on the person. If you know that person is a homeless leach on society with a previous criminal record, a politician trying to raise taxes, a mentally handicapped person, or a fierce business competitor of yours, you should make the self-interested decision to let them die in the emergency situation. In an emergency situation involving a stranger, there usually isn't a whole lot of time to evaluate a person's character and ask, 'Is this person really worth helping?' You have to decide whether [whatever you are doing at the time] is more important than the preservation of another human life. Mdegges, if you do know who the person is, then my statement about it being in your self-interest to let the person die still holds. As I stated above, the existence of a significant number of individuals to trade with is of value, but putting yourself out to save one complete stranger in the 'sea of individuals' is not self-interested by any stretch. Can anyone explain how this assertion of mine is wrong AND/OR provide evidence that Ayn Rand was referring specifically to self-interest in saving some stranger in an emergency. Putting yourself out how? Putting your life at significant risk to save a complete stranger, when it isn't your job and there aren't any extenuating circumstances, is probably not in your self-interest. Missing an important meeting in order to save the life of a complete stranger, quite possibly is. (Personally I can't think of a meeting I've ever had which was so important that it couldn't wait for me to make a detour to save someone's life, certainly not other than in hindsight, but I'm sure you could come up with a hypothetical which suggests otherwise.) "Anthony, here's an example: say you get lazy and fail to go to work, and get into such dire straits (an "emergency") that you must steal some food. It is right for you to steal the food rather than just dying, but after doing so, you should accept the punishment, attempt to pay restitution, and reform your lazy ways." Okay, but should you, or should you not, try your best to legally minimize that punishment? Sure, especially if you pay restitution. Regarding "selfless" help of strangers: if there's no value in it, there's no reason for it. If you've got nothing better to do than save strangers from death, there's value in that, if for no other reason than to make friends whom you can team up with as the emergency continues. An emergency is hell. Why not make friends? It's not in my self interest to walk away and do nothing when I see ANYONE being beaten/raped/murdered/hanging off a building/dying of a heart attack (these are realistic emergencies, where a person's life is in imminent danger). None of these horrible acts benefit me or add any value to my life. I imagine I would feel tremendously guilty and cowardly if I did nothing when witnessing a mentally ill child (or politician, etc) being raped in an alley. I suspect most people would feel the same. Where does it follow from Objectivist philosophical principles that one should act to help another in such an emergency? How and where does Rand justify it philosophically? Are you saying that it is in your rational self interest to help a drowning tax-happy politician? Not only do you take some risk to your own life in the short term, but you "shoot yourself in the foot" for the longer term as well. Your gut feelings are in competition here with your rational self-interest. Rand justifies our natural and healthy feelings of sympathy toward strangers in "The Ethics of Emergencies", which is part of "The Virtue of Selfishness". See page 40: "A rational man does not forget that life is the source of all values and..." As for the drowning tax-happy politician, see the paragraph ending with "...until and unless he forfeits it." As for the line "It is only in emergency situations that one should volunteer to help strangers, if it is in one’s power.", Rand follows it, in the following paragraph, with an example which is not a "metaphysical emergency", but where one "may" provide help "if one can afford it (as an act of good will, not of duty)". I guess Rand is drawing a distinction between emergency situations where one "should" help, and non-emergencies where one "may" help. But this seems sloppy to me. mdegges, I agree with you. Orb85750, it seems you are trying to indicate that Ayn Rand thought that helping people in emergencies is an intrinsic value, as evidenced by your raising the example of the tax-happy politician. It's not. There's a difference between a principle and a rule. "help everyone in an emergency" is a rule. "act in your self-interest" is a principle. Principles must be applied to a context to determine a particular conclusion. Applying the principle of self-interest to emergency situations results in helping some people. But you cannot be blind to whom you save. So are you basically saying that one should not save another human being in an emergency situation if it is not in your rational self-interest to do so? (!) One should not do anything which is not in one's self-interest to do. "I should do X" is equivalent to "It is in my self-interest to do X". "It is in my self-interest to do X" is equivalent to "I should do X". In The Virtue of Selfishness, Rand writes, "It is on the ground of that generalized good will and respect for the value of human life that one helps strangers in an emergency." This really has nothing to do with self-interest, nor is it clear why an individual should value the life of a complete stranger. It seems to be an ad hoc rule, because she fails to show how it follows directly from any Objectivist principle? Did you read the whole thing? She doesn't present a formal proof, but she does explain it. If you have read it, which part are you having trouble with? Do you not accept that human life, even the lives of strangers, is a value to you? Personally I believe that the vast majority of human lives are of value to me. This is especially true of the people whom I would be likely to run across in an emergency situation. But it's not true of all people. If I came across a drowning Jared Lee Loughner, if it wasn't in any way my fault that he was drowning, if I wan't on duty as a lifeguard or something, if there weren't any other extenuating circumstances, I would, and should, walk away. Of course, it's a stupid, unrealistic hypothetical. Whereas "drowning stranger whom I can save with low risk to myself" is plausible though rare. Starting with first principles (Objectivist principles), it would not follow that it's my moral obligation to stop my car on the way to a business meeting and dive into a lake to save a complete stranger. That's the kind of (selfless) moral action promoted by some philosophies that are antithetical to Objectivism. So Rand's "ethics of emergencies" really seems quite ad hoc to me -- also because Rand absolutely does not consider it a moral obligation to help with the survival of those in abject poverty who don't have access to proper resources or mobility. I'm not sure what you're saying. Rand never said that it's your moral obligation to stop your car on the way to a business meeting to dive into a lake to save a complete stranger. In fact, she says that it is morally proper to save a drowning stranger "only when the danger to one's own life is minimal". Also, I'm not sure if "complete stranger" is meant to be different from "stranger", but in any non-hypothetical case you're going to have at least some clues about this person. "So are you basically saying that one should not save another human being in an emergency situation if it is not in your rational self-interest to do so? (!)" Absolutely, yes. But do not think that self-interest is only material. Your self-interest involves your spiritual well-being too. Unless you have some groundless malice towards every other person, you'll want to help people whom you can help when it isn't a major inconvenience to you. If you fail to make an easy save, it will cause you to feel guilt. Such is not in your interest. 'One should not do anything which is not in one's self-interest to do. "I should do X" is equivalent to "It is in my self-interest to do X". "It is in my self-interest to do X" is equivalent to "I should do X".' Anthony is absolutely, completely dead right here. Anthony, my assumption about diving in the lake to save a drowning stranger is that I am a good swimmer! (Right, I neglected to mention that.) But in such a case, I think Rand would argue that the risk to my life would be minimal, so it would be my moral obligation? John, I really do like your reasoning here. It's much more in tune with Objectivism than what Rand herself wrote (which was quite disappointing to read). Specifically, Rand wrote that if you are able to help at minimal risk to yourself, that you should help in an emergency. That's not necessarily centered around rational self-interest (as discussed above). But I think that self-interest needs to be central for such action, from a consistent Objectivist perspective, I think we agree. I don't think Rand has ever used the term "moral obligation" in the way which you are ascribing to her. The quote is "it is morally proper to save [a drowning stranger] only when the danger to one's own life is minimal". "Not improper" is not "morally obligated". Also, I could be wrong about this, but I don't think your hypothetical of a drowning stranger, whom you come across while driving to work, qualifies under Rand's definition of "emergency situation". The key distinction between this and Rand's description of emergencies is that you yourself are not already caught in the disaster. "Unless you have some groundless malice towards every other person, you'll want to help people whom you can help when it isn't a major inconvenience to you." I want to add that I completely agree with this. Also, Rand pretty much says as much in the opening paragraphs of "The Ethics of Emergencies" (c.f. "those psychopaths who do not challenge..."). You're a good swimmer, you've been trained in water rescue, there's a drowning man right in front of you, you assess that you can save him with minimal risk to yourself, and you don't want to help? What kind of psycho are you? Anthony, your last point appears to contradict your first point in the comment immediately above. Did you forget, when making the last statement, that you agreed with "when it isn't a major inconvenience to you" (?) A person with all the necessary skills can still be inconvenienced in a major way. So you'd ask such a person what kind of psycho he is? Rand states that one should help if they are able to do so at minimal risk. She does not state that one should help if they are able to do so at minimal effort. Rand is usually fairly black & white with her statements, but not here! It's interesting that she uses ambiguous words like "proper" when referring to a moral issue. It's as if the whole emergency problem is somewhat uncertain in her mind. ALSO, does she differentiate anywhere between an emergency in which one is directly involved and which one is not? (as Anthony indicates above -- good point, Anthony) Well, my last point doesn't contradict the statement I quoted, but it goes further than it. But that might just be that I am looking at "want to help" differently. A normal person is certainly going to have a strong emotional reaction, even if they ultimately decide not to help. Rand does not say one should help if they are able to do so at minimal risk. She says one should help a drowning stranger "only when the danger to one's own life is minimal". The words "only when" do not mean the same as "whenever". "You should cross the road only when you have looked both ways" does not mean the same as "You should cross the road whenever you have looked both ways". Anthony, I think you may have found the essential confusion here. Could you point out specifically where in orb's argument he misinterprets Ayn Rand in the manner you describe? "should help only when the danger to one's own life is minimal" -- What does that mean to you different than "You should help if there is minimal risk to your own life?" (It seems pretty straightforward to me. I don't think I'm having trouble interpreting what Rand meant. Let's not muddy the waters unnecessarily.) Q "if" P indicates that the condition P is sufficient for Q; Q "only if" P indicates that the condition P is necessary for Q; Q "if and only if" P indicates that the condition P is both necessary and sufficient for Q. http://www.csm.ornl.gov/~sheldon/ds/sec1.2.html http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/only_if "only when" works the same way as "only if". Put another way: "If the person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him only when the danger to one’s own life is minimal" means "If the person to be saved is a stranger and it is morally proper to save him, then the danger to one's own life is minimal." "If the person to be saved is a stranger, it is morally proper to save him if the danger to one’s own life is minimal" means "If the person to be saved is a stranger and the danger to one's own life is minimal, then it is morally proper to save him." Fine, but you still seem to be circumventing a central question above. She (Rand) says one should help a drowning stranger "only when the danger to one's own life is minimal". Does that mean that one is morally obligated to do so? Or could she mean something else by "should help?" Yes, you are morally obligated to help strangers in an emergency, but only if the danger to your own life is minimal. I think, though, that the context Ayn Rand intended is when you and the strangers are in the same emergency. The assumption is that saving people is the best thing you can do, as opposed to standing around and watching them die. That is, when you are in an emergency with other people, you should help them if it doesn't put your life at great risk. One could go further and consider the case where you are not in the emergency yourself. In such case, you are morally obligated to help, if there's no great risk for you, and if you don't have something much more important to do. The lives of others do not have intrinsic value. One is always at liberty to judge whether others are worth saving -- and, of course, one can be mistaken in one's judgment. Ayn Rand is cautioning against making the wrong judgment in choosing to help someone. She's not cautioning against not helping, even though that is also a potential mistake. In short, she's saying "don't throw away your life for people you don't know." She's assuming that you are decent enough to want to help people who are in danger, and she's saying "be careful -- don't sacrifice yourself." "She (Rand) says one should help a drowning stranger "only when the danger to one's own life is minimal". Does that mean that one is morally obligated to do so?" No. I feel like I've explained this. "You should do A only when B" means "You should not do A unless B". Substituting A and B we get "[You should not help a drowning stranger] unless the danger to one's own life is minimal." (I think this is somewhat incomplete, one should help a drowning stranger, even when the danger is moderate, if that is part of one's job, but I suppose this is out of the context of Rand's statement.) "One could go further and consider the case where you are not in the emergency yourself." Isn't that the case of the starving neighbor? [Answer - no, it isn't - not unchosen or unexpected.] "I think, though, that the context Ayn Rand intended is when you and the strangers are in the same emergency." I think so, because she says that "In an emergency situation, men’s primary goal is to combat the disaster, escape the danger and restore normal conditions (to reach dry land, to put out the fire, etc.)." If it's someone else's emergency, the "escape the danger" part doesn't really make sense. OK, so it seems that John and Anthony are offering opposing answers to the moral obligation in an emergency question. Can anyone else chime in here?? ANTHONY, If there is somehow absolutely no risk whatsoever to your life, are you morally obligated to help a drowning stranger? Orb, it seems you think of moral obligation as something over and above reason. It is not. That which one ought to do is that which is smart to do. I've given, repeatedly, the reasons why one might want to save a stranger when there's little to no risk. Those reasons are the sole indications of any moral obligation. Moral obligation comes from nowhere other than reason. The question "Is it rational to help?" means the same thing as "Is there a moral obligation to help?" Rationality and morality are coextensive. "OK, so it seems that John and Anthony are offering opposing answers to the moral obligation in an emergency question." Actually, we've answered different questions. I was quoting Rand, and her statement did not use the term "emergency", let alone "in the same emergency". "If there is somehow absolutely no risk whatsoever to your life, are you morally obligated to help a drowning stranger?" First of all, I don't think "morally obligated" is the right term. I might be wrong about this, but to me the term "obligated" suggests that I made some sort of promise or agreement or contract. Secondly, I think this question is unrealistic. I can't imagine a situation in which there was no risk to my life, and I did not save a drowning stranger. Actually, I take that back. What if there was a drowning stranger and my drowning wife, and I could only save one? Obviously, if there was a drowning stranger and my drowning wife, and I could only save one, I'd save my wife. I'd thus not help a drowning stranger despite the fact that there is no risk whatsoever to my life. And I think I would have made the correct moral decision. Now should I contemplate what if I would only lose my eyesight, or my right arm, or a multimillion dollar contract, or a gold medal in the men's marathon? We can continue to come up with more and more absurd hypotheticals, I suppose. But I don't see the point of the exercise. One's "moral obligation" is simply what one ought to do. "Moral obligation" is, however a highfalutin phrase for what is right in action. What is right is what is smart. That's all. I basically agree with John. You should help "if there's no great risk for you, and if you don't have something [] more important to do." Although, I think the answer begs the question. At all times you ought to do whatever is most important (i.e. whatever is most valuable). The key point though is that you should base what is most important on your own hierarchy of values, not someone elses. I think John's Objectivist explanation makes sense, and I do agree with it as well. Why does Rand go on about what one should do, with a condition about risk to one's life, but not a condition about the amount of effort it might take to help in an emergency in which you are able to help. (Or is that part present -- do I need to reread it?) What would you want her to say about effort? What can be said about effort? I don't think "I was too lazy to help" is ever a good excuse. I think if anything Rand said too much on the matter. Saving the life of a random stranger is of value. (Saving the life of someone who lives in your community, or in a place you like to visit, which is not completely random, is of even more value.) One should not be indifferent on the matter. Exactly how much of a value, and exactly how much of a value various other things are, is not something that can be spelled out with hard rules. "Exactly how much of a value, and exactly how much of a value various other things are, is not something that can be spelled out with hard rules." This is absolutely correct, and it highlights the essential difference between principles and rules. A rule acts as a substitute for thought: "When stranger in danger and low risk to save, save" is a rule. Rules ignore context such as the possibility that one's own wife might be in danger too. Following a rule can make you act stupid. A principle, however, gives less concrete advice. "Pursue one's own best interests" is a principle. Applying a principle to a situation requires thinking. Morality is about principles, not rules. If I'm in a boat wreck and I'm losing my beloved boat, my dog (who was on the boat), and/or the stranger with whom I've collided, it is up to me (and my values) how to prioritize my efforts, correct? -- i.e. whether to concentrate on saving my boat, my dog, or the stranger. My choice should not be deemed immoral if it is being made according to my rational self-interest. Well, yes, your choice is not immoral if it is made according to your rational self-interest. That said, what is in your rational self-interest is objective, not subjective. If you are at fault for the accident, and you claim that it is in your rational self-interest to let the stranger die and save your dog, even though you know you could have chosen to save the stranger and let your dog die, then you are wrong, in the same sense that you are wrong if you claim 2+2=5. OK, but if it's a true accident with neither party clearly at fault (or both equally at fault), then I understand that it is not immoral to save my dog or my boat first, whichever means more to me. I can't imagine having that much affection for a boat or a dog. I'd certainly be wary of a person who claimed to have rationally made that choice. (Maybe if it was a guide dog that helped you get around all your life or something. Or maybe I don't understand as I've never owned a dog.) In a case where both parties are at fault, I'd still say you have an obligation to not let your negligence turn into negligent homicide. Well, you obviously aren't too attached to any companion animals. Your loyal companion for a decade -- but you choose to save a complete stranger instead? And if you've worked hard 20 years for your boat and you have a chance to save it, then perhaps you might understand that decision too. Anthony, I'm with orb on this one. The possibility of losing your boat, or your dog, could reasonably be considered "great risk", which would prevent you from going the extra mile to save a stranger in danger. One's property is an extension of one's life. One should not consider one's own property inherently expendable when the life of a stranger is at risk. It's not only one's own physical body that matters. Of course, this is in the case where you clearly did not cause the accident. If you did, then letting him die could be manslaughter. As for negligent homicide, I would hope that such only applies in a situation where there is not great risk to the person who neglects to help. That is, if helping a person involves great risk to me, I shouldn't be punished for not helping. The negligence would be negligence in contributing to the cause of the accident, "In a case where both parties are at fault". For instance, both parties are speeding and they crash into each other. Both parties are equally at fault. You say yourself that "letting him die could be manslaughter". I certainly didn't intend that the act of not giving help was the negligence. Not giving help would only be a crime in itself if you had some sort of duty to the victim, for instance if you were the captain of the ship, the victim was a passenger, and you abandoned ship to save your dog. The crime is in speeding. But speeding which results in injury is not nearly as bad as speeding which results in death. orb, as I said, I've never had a dog, so I maybe I just don't understand. I understand even less when it comes to a boat. That's replaceable. A human life isn't. But A) I could be wrong about this; and B) I'm not suggesting that I would physically retaliate against someone who did this sort of thing. I'd be wary. It would be up to them to prove my assumption of their character wrong. I'd give them that chance, though, if they were interested in telling their story. Also, this is all based on an accident which is no one's fault, which seems unlikely in the first place. Yes, but an accident which is no-one's fault is very similar to an emergency which befalls two vessels at the same time. When you are in an emergency, your primary obligation is to protect your values. Once they are safe, you might then think about saving other people. Of course, you might value other people more than your own boat or dog. But that's a personal choice. Anyway, I think we're all on the same page here.
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