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Thomas Sowell postulates that a problem among intellectuals and philosophers is that they have all these ideas but the standard of their success is not whether they are empirically correct but that they are popular. so is the ultimate test for philosophy whether it works in the real world? |
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Objectivism is not empiricism. A proper philosophy is formed by observation of reality, and of history. Given enough observations of reality, and of human action in reality, one can begin logically to form principles about the nature of reality and of man. If one forms these principles rationally, then they are true. There is not some subsequent empirical "test" that needs to be performed on these principles in order to verify them. History itself, as well as present-day observations, are evidence enough for the correctness of philosophical principles. Specifically, to know whether Objectivism is true, we do not have to first create a society based on Objectivism, and then see if it succeeds by some standard. The belief that such is required is a variant of empiricism and of pragmatism. Empiricism holds that concrete evidence is the standard of truth. Empiricism holds abstraction and logic in contempt. Pragmatism holds that concrete results are the standard of correctness of a policy. Pragmatism holds moral principles, i.e. abstract moral ideas, in contempt. Objectivism upholds abstraction from concrete evidence, in both truth and morality. Abstraction is a uniquely human mental ability, which is of immense value in the identification of the true and the good. Once an abstraction or principle is formed, it is validated not by reference to the future results of its application. It is validated by reference to the past evidence from which it was logically formed. Once one has a valid principle, one simply applies it. If things, then, do not go as expected, one does not immediately reject or even doubt the principle. One looks to form another principle which will explain this special case. For more information about the proper formation of principles, refer to Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, specifically the discussion about certainty, regarding the theory of human blood types. but because human knowledge is limited (because we cannot be infallible)then cant historical observations and deductions be false (as many scientist are false)? Isn't reason itself limited in application by the extent the individual has knowledge of what is contradictory and what is not and therefore rational or irrational? to add...everything we do is in a scope of uncertainty because of our lack of knowledge of everything therefore our non-contradictory ideas (rational ideas) could be objectively false; i agree with Rand's definition of reason and its importance but reason depends on our knowledge, which is imperfect, as are our "rational" decisions that many perfectly rational scientist and businessmen do Our knowledge is dependent on reason, not the other way around. Reason is our means for correcting our knowledge, if it is mistaken. Reason can be applied to checking our premises. To claim that reason somehow can't work, because it is possible to be mistaken, is to presume that some of our ideas (mistaken or not) come to us by some way outside of reason. Reason is the means by which we form and check our ideas. And our ideas can be about anything. Fallibility is not the indication of some area where reason cannot be productive. i'm confused, a scientist may believe something that turns out to be false, but if he used reason to determine the theory then why was he false? If it's because a lack of knowledge then doesn't that mean our ability to know what is non-contradictory is dependent on how much we actually know? There are two explanations for why a reason-based theory might be "wrong". First, reason is not automatic, and the application of it isn't trivial. People are fallible. That you used reason, but still came up with a false conclusion means you didn't use it right. Second, there are cases where people expect too much of reason. Reason cannot predict the existence of special cases which extend our knowledge. For example, one might, at an early context of knowledge, conclude: "dropping things makes them fall." [cont'd] But then, a bit later, you might discover helium balloons. This doesn't mean that reason has failed you, and it also doesn't mean you made a mistake earlier. Given the earlier context, you had every reason to believe that dropping things makes them fall. It's the use of reason that enables you to incorporate the behavior of helium balloons into your physical understanding. Reason cannot give infallible predictions of as-yet-unknown phenomena. It cannot tell you about that which you have not yet learned. But it is the means by which you learn about new things. I'm sure the above seems puzzling. It's an example of fact that certainty is contextual. You might even say it identifies a limit of reason: that reason cannot tell you about that for which you do not yet have evidence. ohhhh...so reason is based on the gathering of non-contradictory evidence and synthesizing it into a rational understanding which forms the basis of further knowledge and therefore further application of reason...its a learning experience. I must have been confusing knowledge with evidence for knowledge, thanks! "non-contradictory evidence" is a redundancy. Evidence as such does not contradict. Contradictions are in inferences from evidence. Actually, to go a bit deeper: evidence is perceptual. Propositions are conceptual. Only propositions can contradict. Reason integrates perceptual evidence into a non-contradictory conceptual whole.
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