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The numerous legal frameworks that purport to regulate various industries in the United States and Canada entail gross violations of individual rights, most commonly property rights and the freedom of contract. Clearly, these laws are disconnected from the fundamental justification for the government's monopoly on the retaliatory use of force. In this context, should an Objectivist judge, tasked with the implementation of such a regulatory regime, adhere to objective principles of judicial interpretation? Should he rule according to the clear and plain meaning of the regulations (if any such thing can be said to exist, given the popularity of terms like "in the public interest" - but let us assume for the purposes of this question that an objectively ascertainable meaning of Law A is possible, and that the meaning violates right X)? Alternatively, should he bend over backwards to vindicate individual rights in the face of such a violation, perhaps by relying on obviously weak interpretations of terms or by ignoring sections of relevant laws that are adverse to his preferred interpretation? Is there a third route available to him? Although this appears to be the quintessential "lose-lose" situation, what advice would you give such a judge in reaching the best possible verdict? |
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The proper response depends on how corrupt the legal system has become. If the government has become fundamentally hostile to individual rights, as was the case in Atlas Shrugged (or in modern totalitarian states like Nazi Germany or North Korea), then withdrawing sanction and support from the system as a whole is an appropriate response. This applies to judges as much as to any other profession under a totalitarian regime. The more interesting question is the mixed case, as in the United States today. If we take the view that an Objectivist cannot morally act as a judge in a mixed economy due to the risk of having to enforce unjust laws, we cede control of the government to those unconcerned with the justice of the laws they enforce. While every individual has their own limit, I think there would be great value in a judge who explicitly upholds the rule of law by enforcing unjust laws while simultaneously explaining the injustice of the law being applied. Mixed systems survive in part by never letting the nature of what they are doing become clear. An Objectivist judge who made clear the implications of consistent application of unjust laws might well be a great force for good in the culture. It is also worth noting that there are choices other than 'apply the law' and 'resign' -- for example, a judge might recuse himself from a particular case if he found himself unable to render objective judgment on it under the law as written. An Objectivist judge should not subvert the rule of law by acting as though a law does not mean what it objectively does mean. That would be a form of usurpation, and accepting it as a principle by which judges in general should act would replace the rule of law with rule from the bench. Tara Smith's article "Why Originalism Won't Die: Common Mistakes in Competing Theories of Judicial Interpretation" touches on some of these issues, particularly in Section VII. |